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On	Brexit,	Transition,	Customs	Partnership	and	Max
Fac	–	a	drama	in	four	acts
The	Brexit	process	has	had	its	share	of	surprising	twists	and	turns.	But	even	seasoned	observers
were	taken	by	surprise	recently	when	the	Sun	reported	that	“Brexiteers	urge	Theresa	May	to
extend	the	transition	period”.	Experts	have	long	agreed	that	the	transition	period	currently	provided
for	in	the	Withdrawal	Agreement	is	unlikely	to	be	long	enough	to	successfully	negotiate	a	broad
Free	Trade	Agreement	(read	Association	Agreement)	between	the	UK	and	the	EU.	So	is	this	news
evidence	that	rationality	is	returning	to	the	Brexit	debate?	Sadly,	no,	writes	Holger	Hestermeyer
(King’s	College	London).	Rather,	we	are	witnessing	a	surreal	play	–	a	drama	in	four	acts.
Act	1:	The	Brexit	Process	(really	more	of	a	dramatic	introduction)
It	is,	at	times,	useful	to	remind	ourselves	where	in	the	Brexit	process	we	actually	are.	Art.	50	of	the	TEU,	the	sparse
legal	provision	on	withdrawing	from	the	EU	that	is	now	fleshed	out	in	practice	for	the	first	time,	provides	that	after	the
notification	of	the	intention	to	withdraw	“the	Union	shall	negotiate	and	conclude	an	agreement”	with	the	withdrawing
state	“setting	out	the	arrangements	for	its	withdrawal,	taking	account	of	the	framework	for	its	future	relationship	with
the	Union”.	The	provision	gives	the	partners	(in	principle)	two	years	to	get	the	agreement	in	place,	after	two	years	the
EU	Treaties	cease	to	apply	to	the	withdrawing	member.
Second	century	Roman	mosaic	in	the	Musei	Capitolini.	Photo:	Mary	Harrsch	via	a	CC-BY-NC-
SA	2.0	licence
What	is	to	be	negotiated	in	those	two	years,	however,	is	merely	the	withdrawal	agreement	“taking	account”	of	the
framework	for	the	future	relationship.	The	agreement	on	the	future	relationship	between	the	two	partners	itself	can,
as	the	European	Council	explains	in	one	of	its	guidelines,	“only	be	finalised	and	concluded	once	the	United	Kingdom
has	become	a	third	country”.	Where	are	we	in	the	process?	We	are	currently	still	negotiating	the	withdrawal
agreement.
Act	2:	Transition	(the	drama	begins)
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The	fact	that	we	will	only	really	negotiate	the	final	UK-EU	relationship	after	the	UK	has	already	left	the	EU	poses	a
difficult	question:	what	happens	between	the	time	of	Brexit	and	the	entry	into	force	of	the	future	relationship?	How
can	the	time	between	the	moment	that	the	EU	Treaties	cease	to	apply	and	the	future	agreement	comes	into	place	be
bridged?
Several	options	are,	in	theory,	available.	The	partners	opted	for	a	solution	they	refer	to	as	a	“transition”	or
“implementation”	period.	This	refers	to	a	set	of	provisions	in	the	withdrawal	agreement	(currently	Art.	121	et	seq.)
that,	roughly,	extend	the	validity	of	EU	law	and	the	status	quo	in	that	respect	for	the	UK	for	the	transition	period,	but
the	UK	will	not	be	represented	in	EU	institutions.	There	are	quite	a	few	problems	with	this	construction	of	the
transition	period.	Let’s	limit	ourselves	to	one:	the	agreement	currently	provides	for	a	transition	period	until	31
December	2020.	The	reason	is	that	after	this	date	the	next	multi-annual	financial	framework	for	the	EU	will	begin	and
both	partners	want	to	avoid	the	mess	of	involving	the	UK.
However,	most	experts	agree	that	getting	a	final	deal	between	the	EU	and	the	UK	in	place	until	that	date	is	unlikely.
So	the	transition	period	might	not	currently	resolve	the	problem	of	the	time	gap	between	Brexit	and	the	coming	into
force	of	a	future	agreement	between	UK	and	EU.	What	is	worse,	the	withdrawal	agreement	does	not	provide	for	a
means	to	prolong	the	transition	period.	This,	for	the	EU,	will	be	problematic,	because	the	only	reason	it	feels	it	can
conclude	the	withdrawal	agreement	including	a	transition	in	the	first	place	is	because	of	a	competence	under	Art.	50
of	the	TEU.	It	will	no	longer	be	able	to	rely	on	that	competence	after	Brexit.	And	while	a	longer	transition	period	also
causes	legal	problems,	several	experts	advocated	at	least	providing	for	a	means	to	prolong	the	transition	period	in
the	withdrawal	agreement.
So	should	we	rejoice	that	this	seems	to	be	what	some	ministers	seem	to	advocate?
Act	3:	On	customs	partnerships	and	max	fac	(the	drama	thickens)
Well.	Not	really.	The	reason	they	seem	to	want	to	consider	a	longer	transition	period	is	that	the	Cabinet	is	hopelessly
divided	between	two	visions	of	the	future	customs	relationship	between	UK	and	EU:	a	customs	partnership	favoured
by	the	PM	and	a	max	fac	proposal	favoured	by	the	so-called	Brexiters.	The	Cabinet	not	only	needs	time	to	decide:	if
it	chooses	max	fac,	it	also	needs	time	for	this	option	to	be	put	into	place.	It	is	in	this	third	act	that	our	drama	turns
surreal.
The	two	visions	of	the	future	have	been	neatly	summarized	in	this	House	of	Commons	Library	Briefing	Paper.
The	Customs	Partnership	at	its	core	proposes	that	the	UK	at	its	border	mirrors	EU	customs	law	and	thereby	virtually
becomes	an	EU	border,	allowing	goods	entering	the	EU	via	the	UK	to	seamlessly	cross	the	border.	Goods	intended
for	the	UK	market,	however,	would	be	subject	to	UK	customs	laws.	The	practical	complexity	of	this	proposal	is
enormous,	as	it	would	involve	tracking	an	enormous	number	of	products.	But	so	is	the	legal	complexity,	raising
issues	under	both	WTO	and	EU	law.	Does	the	requirement	to	track	imported	products	violate	Art.	III	of	the	GATT?
Would	the	EU	be	able	to	agree	to	the	UK	acting	as	an	EU	border	without	being	bound	by	EU	customs	law,	giving	it
direct	effect,	supremacy	and	applying	it	under	supervision	by	the	Court	of	Justice	of	the	European	Union	and	the
Commission?	Bear	in	mind	that	this	would	mean	that	the	EU	trusts	a	non-Member	State	with	the	collection	of
resources	that	are	“own	resources”	more	than	its	own	Member	States.	But	max	fac	has	its	own	problems.	This
proposal	involves	streamling	customs	arrangements	and	simplifying	requirements	e.g.	through	authorised	economic
operator	schemes	and	technology	to	facilitate	customs	processes.	“Maximum	facilitation”	at	a	border	is	certainly
desirable,	but	–	as	the	Northern	Ireland	Affairs	Committee	of	the	House	of	Commons	concluded	–	currently	there	are
no	technical	(or	other)	solutions	available	that	make	a	border	invisible,	and	this	is	what	the	UK	is	committed	to	in
Northern	Ireland.
And	this	is	where	our	drama	becomes	surreal:	the	EU	has	largely	rejected	both	of	these	proposals,	as	they	would	not
fix	the	problem	of	the	Northern	Irish	border.	The	Cabinet	thus	is	currently	fighting	over	which	of	two	dead	cats	will	be
released	into	the	wild.
Act	4:	Why	transition	will	not	help	(the	drama	self-destructs)
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The	reason	we	cannot	rejoice	at	the	request	for	a	longer	transition	period	is	that	this	request	seems	only	to	have
been	made	so	that	max	fac	can	be	adopted	as	a	solution	–	in	the	hope	that	during	the	transition	period,	the	technical
solution	to	border	problems	will	be	found.	This,	however,	utterly	disregards	where	we	stand	in	the	negotiations.
The	transition	is	part	of	the	withdrawal	agreement.	Even	though	the	press	has	already	celebrated	that	agreement	on
transition	has	been	reached	and	there	will	be	a	transition	period,	without	a	withdrawal	agreement	that	will	not
happen.	A	mandatory	part	of	the	withdrawal	agreement	will	be	a	solution	to	the	Northern	Irish	border.	Both	the	UK
and	the	EU	have	reached	agreement	on	this.	Indeed,	they	even	agreed	on	a	“backstop”	solution	guaranteeing	full
alignment	with	those	rules	of	the	Internal	Market	and	the	Customs	Union	supporting	North-South	cooperation,	the	all-
island	economy	and	the	protection	of	the	Good	Friday	Agreement.	What	the	partners	have	not	reached	agreement
on,	is	how	to	put	this	“backstop”	solution	into	operative	legal	language.	The	EU’s	attempt	to	do	so	in	the	withdrawal
agreement	was	rebuffed	by	the	UK.	A	proposal	to	lengthen	the	transition	to	turn	the	much-desired	“maximum
facilitation”	solution	into	technical	reality	hence	will	not	help:	the	Northern	Irish	solution	is	a	condition	for	actually
reaching	a	withdrawal	agreement	and	getting	a	transition.	A	Northern	Irish	solution	that	needs	a	transition	period	to
be	operable	means	that	to	get	there	the	UK	will	have	to	accept	the	backstop	solution.
To	end	this	surreal	theatre,	we	need	to	go	back	to	the	drawing	board.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE,	nor	KCL.
Holger	Hestermeyer	is	the	Shell	Reader	in	International	Dispute	Resolution	at	King’s	College	London.
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